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JUDICIAL SELECTION IN NEW YORK: A NEED
FOR CHANGE
I.

Introduction

On February 27, 1974 Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel of the New
York State Court of Appeals addressed the New York Legislature
regarding the "State of the Judiciary and Judicial System" and
presented dramatic proposals for the reform of the New York state
court system.' In resurrecting the problem of court reform,' the
Chief Judge focused in part on one particularly controversial
area-the selection of the judiciary.'
1. Address by Charles D. Breitel, Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals, Special Joint Meeting of the New York Legislature, Feb. 27,
1974, in 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 229 (1974). See also 171 N.Y.L.J. 4, col. 3 (Feb.
28, 1974); N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
2. The subject of court reform has generated a great deal of legal discussion. See, e.g., ASHMAN & ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION:
THE NOMINATING PROCESS (1974) [hereinafter cited as ASHMAN & ALFINI];
SELECTED READINGS-JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL (G. Winters
rev. ed. 1973); SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE

ed.,
(G.

Winters ed., rev. ed. 1973); Campbell, JudicialSelection and JudicialImpartiality, 1973 JuRiD. REV. 254 [hereinafter cited as Campbell]; Cooperman, Selection of Judges, 37 QUEENS B. BULL. 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Cooperman]; Garwood, JudicialRevision-An Argument for the Merit
Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure, 5 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 1 (1973);
Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, JudicialRemoval in New York: A New
Look-Revisited, 28 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 217 (1973); Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, JudicialRemoval in New York: A New Look, 40 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1 (1971); Kaminsky, Judicial Selection: Alternative to the Status
Quo in the Selection of State Court Judges, 48 St. JOHN'S L. REV. 496
[hereinafter cited as Kaminsky]; New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on
State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction, The Selection of Judges,
28 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 372 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Selection of
Judges]; Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges in
Massachusetts, 58 MAss. L.Q. 131 (1973); Note, Judicial Selection and
Tenure-The Merit Plan In Ohio, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 255 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Judicial Selection].
3. Chief Judge Breitel's proposals require changes in the methods of
judicial selection and discipline as well as modifications in the financing
and structure of the court system. Goldstein, Court Reform Politics, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1974, at 34, col. 1.
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New Yorkers, as well as many other Americans,4 have become
increasingly cognizant of the problem of inefficient administration
of the judicial system by some of our nation's state and federal
judges.5 Such inept direction and judicial misconduct in our courts
have caused the inequitable and unconstitutional adjudication of
numerous cases.' A full awareness of the extent and potential impact of the problem occurs when one examines the influence exerted
by judges in the American system,7 and the ever increasing delays
in our courts, especially in our urban areas.' Such an examination,
coupled with an inquiry into the qualifications of some of the trial
judges, will cause one to appreciate more fully the 1961 campaign
statement made by New York City's former Mayor, Robert F.
Wagner, prior to his establishing the "Mayor's Committee on the
Judiciary." He stated:
It has long been my conviction that our judges should be removed as far as
possible from political control, and particularly that judgeships should never
be used as rewards for political service

Although the need for some type of nonpolitical selection has
often been acknowledged, proposals as to the type and manner of
such selection have varied and are in constant dispute." Chief Judge
4. The problem of unfit judges is not limited to New York City, but is
prevalent in other urban areas. Cf. Buckley, The Commission on Judicial
Qualifications:An Attempt To Deal With Judicial Misconduct, 3 U. SAN
FRAN. L. REV. 244, 245-50 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Buckley] (written

by the Los Angeles Public Defender and based on the experience in the Los
Angeles County Court System of the 248 man Los Angeles Public Defender's Office).
5. The press has properly taken on the role of judicial watchdog. See,
e.g., Newfield, The Next Ten Worst Judges, The Village Voice, Sept. 26,
1974, at 5, col. 1; Newfield, The Ten Worst Judges in New York, NEW YORK
MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 1972, at 32.
6. See text accompanying notes 17-43 infra. See also Buckley 245-50.

7. Buckley 244-50.
8. See Gazell, Indicators of Managerial Consciousness In An Urban
Judicial Bureaucracy,49 DEN. L.J. 489, 493-95 (1973).
9. New York City BarAss'n, Special Comm. On JudicialSelection and
Tenure, 18 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 581, 587 (1963).
10. See, e.g., Cooperman; Buesser & Kopel, Judicial Appointment or
Judicial Election Appointment, 41 DET. LAW. 6 (Sept. 1973); Goldstein,
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Breitel's legislative proposals for the selection of judges are in the
form of amendments to the state constitution and the New York
Judiciary Law."
Based on a similar California plan for the selection of judges,"2
Chief Judge Breitel would have all New York judges appointed by
the governor, mayor or county executive, and then confirmed or
rejected by a confirmation committee. 3 The confirmation committee would be composed of nineteen members: three laymen appointed by the governor; one judge, two attorneys and a layman
appointed by the chief judge of the court of appeals; one layman and
one attorney appointed by the speaker of the assembly; one layman
and one attorney appointed by the senate majority leader; one layman and one attorney appointed by the senate minority leader; one
layman and one attorney appointed by the assembly minority
leader; and one judge each appointed by the presiding justices of the
four departments of the appellate divisions.'4
Although this bill died in the State Assembly Rules Committee
on the Judiciary,' 5 Chief Judge Breitel will apparently continue to
Judicial Groups Split On Reform, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1974, § 1, at 30,
col. 1; 171 N.Y.L.J. 1, col. 3 (Mar. 19, 1974).
11. Chief Judge Breitel's proposals have caused a great deal of discussion among the state's executive, legislative, and judiciary members as
well as political leaders, bar associations, and citizens' committees as to
the type of reforms. See Goldstein, JudicialGroups Split On Reform, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1974, at 30, col. 1; id. Mar. 14, 1974, at 74, col. 6.
12. CAL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 7, 16(d); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1, col. 3 (Mar.
19, 1974). § 68121 (West 1964), as amended, (West Supp. 1974).
13. Chief Judge Breitel presented his legislative package of seven bills
for the reformation of New York's courts on Mar. 19, 1974. 171 N.Y.L.J. 1,
col. 3 (Mar. 20, 1974). The pertinent bill under view is S. 9983, 197th Sess.
(1974) which would amend article VI of the New York State Constitution
and would provide for such a confirmation committee.
14. S. 9983, 197th Sess. (1974).
15. 58 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 98 (1974). The Legislature rejected a modification of Judge Breitel's proposal, previously approved by the state senate,
which allowed the appointment of the court of appeals judges. It also
passed a measure, opposed by the chief judge as infringing on the independence of the judiciary, which would create an independent nine member commission to review judicial conduct. Id. See also 171 N.Y.L.J. 1, col.
3 (Mar. 28, 1974). The bill adding article 2A to the New York Judiciary
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strive for the adoption of this reform"6 as well as others."
This Note will explore the problems resulting from the selection
of unfit judges. It will also evaluate New York State's present provisions for judicial selection and Chief Judge Breitel's reform
measures in light of the success of similar plans instituted in California and Missouri. In addition, the new selection plan of Governor
Hugh L. Carey will be examined.
II. The Problem of the Unfit Judge
The problem of selecting and retaining incompetent judges can
only be appreciated when one realizes the vital role a judge plays
in our system of justice. It is the judge who must apply the proper
legal principles to the set of facts; decide if legislation is constitutional, proper procedure has been followed, crucial evidence is admissable, a criminal defendant or civil litigant has been denied his
constitutional rights; and if a case does in fact exist. Ultimately it
is the judge who controls the rendering of justice by his administration of the law and court procedures."
Law was adopted by the Legislature. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §§ 40-45
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
16. 58 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 98 (1974).
17. Although Chief Judge Breitel opposes the nine member commission
established by section 41 of the New York Judiciary Law, he has proposed

the creation of a statewide commission on judicial conduct which would

investigate complaints of judicial misconduct and would recommend to
the appropriate appellate division or the court of appeals the censure,
removal or retirement of judges. See S. 9980, 197th Sess. (1974). This
would abolish New York's present disciplinary system, which has been
proven to be ineffective, and establish an added safeguard insuring the
continued existence of a competent judiciary. See text accompanying note
1 supra. See also N.Y.S. COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, REPORT CONCERNING
DISCIPLINE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE FIRST AND SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS

30-33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT].
18. "The quality of the judiciary in large measure determines the qual-

ity of justice. It is the judge who tries disputed cases and who supervises

and reviews negotiated dispositions. Through sentencing the judge determines the treatment given an offender. Through the exercise of his administrative power over his court he determines its efficiency, fairness, and
effectiveness. No procedural or administrativereforms will help the courts,
and no reorganizational plan will avail unless the judges have the highest
qualifications, are fully trained and competent, and have high standards
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It is at the trial stage that the judge's role is of the utmost importance, since it is at this level that the majority of cases are adjudicated. 9 In addition, disputes concerning material facts are resolved
at this level.2" Normally the appellate courts will rely on the factual
basis established in the trial court when reaching any further decisions on the case; with limited exceptions the appellate courts' jurisdiction is restricted, by the state's constitution or statutes, to questions of law.2
Despite the importance of the judge, the judiciary has been the
least scrutinized branch of government. Most people have little contact with our courts and those who do, with the exception of the bar,
are normally not in a position to exert any substantial influence in
the adoption of needed court reforms. Although the vast majority
of our civil and criminal trial judges are competent, the relatively
few unfit judges have a deleterious effect on the lives of a number
of people and have led to a crisis of confidence in our judiciary.22
of performance."

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 146

(1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
19. The Trial Judge-Role Analysis and Profile In The Courts, in THE
PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 131-145 (H. Jones ed. 1965); Buckley 244-

50.
20. "Because appellate judges enunciate rules and principles to govern
future cases, it is essential that they have both wisdom and sensitivity to
the practical problems of law enforcement. But the trial judge exerts a far
greater influence on the quality of justice. For the principles of appellate
decisions are viable only when they [are] applied to facts, and the trial
judge supervises the fact finding process. When he serves as a trier of fact
on issues such as search and seizure and confessions, the trial judge has
almost absolute power to assess the credibility of witnesses and to resolve
conflicting testimony. A trial judge's decision to acquit even in the face of
strong evidence of guilt may not be appealed, and it bars further prosecution. Through his attitude or expressions the trial judge may influence the
jury's determination of factual issues in a way which will not be reflected
in the record before an appellate court." SELECTED READINGS-JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE 214 (G. Winters ed., rev. ed. 1973).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(a).
22. Selection of Judges 372; Address by Henry T. Reath, National Conference on Judicial Selection and Tenure, Mar. 20-22, 1974, on file in the
office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal [hereinafter cited as Reath

Address].
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This lack of confidence is not limited to the legal profession, but has
extended to the general public." It is clear that the shortcomings of
the judicial system cannot be attributed solely to the judges sitting
on the bench since antiquated facilities, a constant increase in the
court docket, and the lack of a sufficient number of judges contribute substantially to the problem. However, it is still the judge who
is ultimately entrusted with the administration of justice in our
courtrooms and it is with him that our court reforms must originate.24
The problem of unfit judges2 5 in New York has been extensively
23. Many citizens and politicians consider "that the appointment of a
judge is just another political appointment-a matter of patronage, a reward for political activity and party loyalty." Address by John S. Clark,
President of the American Judicature Society, National Conference on
Judicial Selection and Tenure, Denver, Colo., Mar. 20-22, 1974, on file in
the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal [hereinafter cited as Clark
Address].
24. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 146; Newfield, The Next Ten Worst
Judges, The Village Voice, Sept. 26, 1974 at 5, col. 1; Newfield, The Ten
Worst Judges In New York, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 1972, at 32.
25. Recent reports made by state investigation committees in the area
of sentencing indicate the scope of this problem. These reports disclose
that deaths resulting from the use of illegal guns have increased annually.
N.Y.ST. SELECT COMM. ON CRIME, GUN CONTROL IN NEW YORK 1 (Oct. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE ON CRIME]; N.Y.S. COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, REPORT CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY, ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND
USE OF HANDGUNS IN NEW YORK STATE (Oct. 17, 1974). The Commission of

Investingation concluded that the reason for such increases is reportedly
due to the "failure of the criminal justice system to enforce the gun control
laws of New York, supposedly the toughest in the country." COMMITTEE ON
CRIME 1. Both statistics and individual case studies compiled by the committee support this conclusion. Id. at 2-3. The statistics are provided in
Table 1.
TABLE 1
DANGEROUS WEAPONS FELONIES 1968-1972
Year

Area

1968
1972
1972

N.Y. State
N.Y. State
N.Y. City

Arrests

Indictments

Felony
Convictions

Prison
Sentences

4217
7508
3625

1247
3750
5625

301
1938
1310

83
251
223
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examined in two recent studies: the April 8, 1974 Report of the New

York State Commission of Investigation Concerning Discipline of
the Judiciary in the First and Second JudicialDepartments (Commission of Investigation's Report) 6 and the January 1972 Report of

the Temporary Commission on the New York State Court System
(Dominick Report).7 The Dominick Report identified and summarized the various types of judicial incapacity and misconduct. 8
Listed in order of seriousness, they are:
In New York City less than 4% of those convicted of violations of gun
control laws received prison sentences. However, individual case studies
more dramatically disclose the "lack of concern within the criminal justice
system," of which our judges play such a key role, toward the dangerous
weapons offenders. See COMMITTEE ON CRIME, App. A, at 1-2. The report
discusses the trial of one James Brown on charges of possession of an illegal
handgun. He pleaded guilty to four separate charges and received two
probation sentences and two conditional discharges. See also N.Y. ST.
SELECT COMM. ON CRIME, A STUDY OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS SENTENCES IN

NEW YORK COUNTY 2 (Sept. 27, 1974) [hereinafter cited as NARCOTICS
SENTENCES]. That investigation concluded that during a four year period
from 1969 through 1972 "at least 67 such illegal sentences [were] imposed
on New York County defendants pleading guilty to a felony charge of either
selling or possessing dangerous drugs." Id. at 2. Furthermore, a sharp
contrast in sentencing is reflected in cases discussed in the report. In one
case the defendant who was convicted of selling a minute amount of heroin,

had no prior convictions for drug related offenses and was sentenced to the
maximum 10 years in prison. Id. at 1. In another, the defendant was
convicted of selling a small amount of heroin, had one previous misdemeanor conviction for possession of drugs and was sentenced to a 7 year
term. Id. But in a third case, the defendant was convicted of possession of
150 envelopes of heroin, had a record of 27 prior arrests and was given an
unconditional discharge. Id. App. A, at 2. And in still another case, the
defendant was convicted of illegal possession of drugs, had ten prior
arrests and was given a conditional discharge. Id. App. A, at 5.
26. COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT 1. The investigation was limited to the appellate division's first and second departments.
27. 2 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE NEW YORK STATE
COURT SYSTEM (Jan. 1973) [hereinafter cited as DOMINICK REPORT]. The
Commission is more popularly known as the Dominick Commission, after
its chairman, State Senator Clinton Dominick.
28. Id. The report is in three volumes. The first contains a Summary
of Recommendations, the second is titled Administrating the Court System, and the last is titled Financing the Court System.
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Conduct on the bench
-administrative misconduct-such as, not filling out'reports, not wearing
\p
robe, not advising proper officer of actions
-laziness-such as, starting court late, ending early, taking'afternoons or
days off, taking extended vacations, not appearing at scheduled Cases without explanation, slowness in deciding cases
-lack of patience with persons in court-such as, cutting off counsel and
witnesses, being abrupt with court personnel
-rudeness and arbitrariness-such as, shouting at, berating, or making de-.
rogatory comments about persons in court
-improper use of alcohol-such as, appearing in court with odor of liquor
on breath or partially under influence of alcohol
-inability to hold court because under influence of alcohol
-showing bias against certain classes of litigants-such as, making derogatory comments based on race, religion, or other characteristics of persons in
court
-allowing personal considerations to influence judicial decisions-such as,
favoring friends or making decisions which would indirectly favor self or
friends
-corruptions in office-such as, agreeing to decide a case to favor a party in
exchange for money

Conduct off the bench
-devoting excessive time to nonjudicial duties
-excessive concern with publicity
-financial 'wheeling and dealing'
-indirect political activity
-associations with persons that give rise to suspicions about partiality-for
example, litigants, politicians, lawyers or reputed underworld figures
-running for public or political office
-engaging in immoral conduct
-engaging in illegal conduct
-engaging in illegal conduct that involves moral turpitude

Physical and Mental Problems
-inability to make up mind
-physical infirmities that interfere with judicial activity
-psychological problems that interfere with judicial activity
-habitual drunkenness
-physical or mental disability that completely prevents exercise of judicial
funtions"

The New York State Commission of Investigation Report con29. Id. at 60-61.
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sisted of a review of 376 complaints that were filed between 1968 and
1972 and were contained in the previously unreviewed and confidential files of the appellate division, previously published newspaper
articles regarding cases of judicial misconduct, and an unpublished
3
study made by the New York City Bar Association. 1
The investigation showed that one judge3 was compelled to resign
as a result of the preparation of the requisite charges demanding his
removal by New York's Court on the Judiciary.2 Such charges were
instituted in light of an investigation into the judge's alleged participation in fixing a case heard by him, and his alleged organized crime
connections. 3 Similarly, a judge faced with charges of improperly
using his influence in obtaining zoning changes resigned after an
inquiry 34 resulted in his being served with charges by the Court on
3
the Judiciary. 1
3
In People v. Gentile,'
the appellate division reversed a trial
judge's dismissal of an indictment. 3 The reversal was based on the
trial judge's failure to read the grand jury minutes, as required by
normal court procedure, to determine whether there was sufficient
38
evidence for the grand jury to indict.
Judicial misconduct in the form of intemperance is revealed in
the case of a civil court judge who had three complaints filed against
30.

COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id.
20 App. Div. 2d 412, 247 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1st Dep't 1964).
Id. at 414, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 554; see COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION

REPORT

4.

16.

38. 20 App. Div. 2d at 414, 247 N.Y.S.2d 554. This same judge in a later
1971 case, People v. Ward, 66 Misc. 2d 392, 323 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct.
1971), dismissed a perjury indictment, concluding that the defendant's
conflicting testimony was a product of apparent confusion and aggressive
questioning by the district attorney. Id. at 395-96, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14.
The appellate division reversed this judge once again, holding that any
explanation or defense was for the jury to consider and was not a sufficient
ground for a motion to dismiss. 37 App. Div. 2d 174, 176, 323 N.Y.S.2d 316,
318 (1st Dep't 1971). Subsequently, the defendant was convicted.
COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT

17.
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him. As a result of the second complaint charging intemperant and
abusive treatment of persons in his courtroom, he was informally
warned by the appellate division that any further complaints would
result in the filing of formal charges for his removal."
In In re Suglia,4" charges were made of improper exercise of judicial discretion in return for sexual favors.4 Despite findings that the
judge did in fact violate important provisions of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and a recommendation that appropriate disciplinary
action be taken, the appellate division merely censured the judge.42
The State Committee of Investigation's report concluded that a
number of the Canons of the Codes of Judicial Ethics and Conduct,
the rules prescribing standards for judicial conduct and action, are
often wholly ignored by the judiciary.43
III. Selection of Judges
A.

Historical Development

New York traces its methods of judicial selection and tenure to
England." Prior to 1701, the English royal courts were viewed as
part of the executive, and the judges were appointed by and served
at the sole discretion of the King.45 Following the American Revolution, the colonists, disgruntled by the English Kings' oppressive
control of the judiciary, attempted to establish methods of judicial
appointment which would insure against any similar abuses by the
executive branch.4" As a result, three new appointive systems were
instituted by the thirteen states: appointment by the legislature,47
39.

COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT

18.

40. 36 App. Div. 2d 326, 320 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1st Dep't 1971).
41. Id. at 327, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 353-54. See also COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT 27.
42. 36 App. Div. 2d at 328, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 354; see COMMISSION OF
INVESTIGATION REPORT 24.

43.

COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT

2, 24-28.

44. ASHMAN & ALFINI 7-8; Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection
and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 12-19 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Nelson]; Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical
Perspective, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 523, 524 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Niles, HistoricalPerspective].
45. ASHMAN & ALFINI 8.
46. Id.
47. Eight states vested appointment in one or both of the legislative
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appointment by the governor and his council,4" and appointment by
the governor subject to approval by a council. 9 New York adopted
the last of the three methods at its 1777 State Constitutional Convention. 0 However, since the voting privilege was limited to landowners, a few wealthy landowning families were able to, in effect,
select the members of the state's executive and legislative branches
and thereby control the state's judicial appointments.' The ideal of
an independent judiciary clearly was not in existence during this
period.5"
The 1846 Constitutional Convention reflected the Jacksonian political philosophy that, in order to preserve equality among men, all
public officials, including judges, should be elected. The delegates
attacked the appointive system as creating an "elite class," and
subsequently abolished the appointive method, establishing an
5 3

elected judiciary.

houses. The states adopting this method were Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Virginia. Nelson 14 n.47.
48. Two states, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, adopted this
method. Id. at 14 n.46.
49. Three states, New York, Maryland, and Massachusetts, adopted
this method. Id. at 14 n.45.
50. N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. xxiii; see Niles, HistoricalProspective532
n. 11.

51. Niles, Historical Perspective 523-24. Control of the judiciary was
very important since these landowners were in constant litigation over
landlord-tenant disputes. Id.
52. A significant blow to this antiquated feudalistic control resulted
from the abolition of the ownership of property qualification as a prerequisite to voting. In addition the state constitution was amended to provide
for the confirmation of the governor's judicial appointments by the senate
itself, instead of the Council for the Appointment of Officers. N.Y. CONST.
of 1821, art. IV, § 7. See Niles, HistoricalPerspective 532 n.11.
53. Niles, Historical Perspective 526-27. However, it is interesting to
note some questions posed by one of the delegation who favored the retention of the appointive system: "Will not the judge be apt to remember the
man who greatly promoted, perhaps secured his election? Will he forget
him who opposed him with zeal and energy, and perhaps intemperate
heat? In view of re-election, will he be sure to do impartial and exact
justice in a controversy between the powerful and the powerless? Between
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The New York constitutional conventions which followed saw a
number of challenges to the elective method, but none succeeded.54
However, with the post-Civil War period came industrialization,
which in turn led to the growth of large cities. 5 The move toward
urbanization resulted in the creation of the well-known "political
machines" of our day." It soon became apparent that in the large
urban areas the elective method had degenerated into de facto
appointive systems.57 Attempts to have appellate division justices
elected caused a great debate amongst the judiciary in the 1890s and
at the 1894 constitutional convention. Ultimately such a proposal
was defeated.5" At this same convention, however, the Mayor of New
York City was given the power to appoint judges to the New York
City Criminal Court. 9 Despite persistent rumbles of discontent, no
significant effort was made to bring about any statewide counterreforms until the 1967 constitutional convention.
Under New York's present system, the majority of New York
judges are elected. The exceptions are judges appointed to the New
York City Criminal and Family Courts by the mayor, the appellate
division judges selected by the governor for five year terms from
present supreme court justices, and court of claims judges appointed by the governor. °
In light of the recent revelations of political corruption within all
branches of our state and federal government, a number of the
state's bar associations6 and prominent legal minds have stepped
him who may control many votes and him who can control none?" Id. at
526.
54. Id. at 528-29.
55. ASHMAN & ALFINI 9.
56. Id.
57. Niles, HistoricalPerspective 529. The growing dissatisfaction with
the political controls exerted over the judiciary, led to the establishment
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1870, which in turn
led in the fight to improve the popular elective method and thereby free
the judiciary from such influence. See ASHMAN & ALFINI 10.
58. Niles, Historical Perspective 530.
59. Kaminsky 503.
60. The relevant New York constitutional provisions providing for
these selection methods are N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 4c-d, 6c, 9, 12b, 13a,
15a, 16h, 17d, 21.
61. The American Bar Association, the New York State Bar Associa-
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up their efforts to have some form of a merit selection plan
adopted.2 Despite this increased effort, proposed judicial selection
reforms contained in the proposed judiciary article of the 1967 New
York State Constitution have not been enacted. 3
B.

Evaluating the Methods of Judicial Selection
1.

Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections

It is apparent that the existing system of selecting members of the
judiciary in New York is not satisfactory. Yet the issue of whether
to adopt a completely elective, appointive or merit selection system
provokes a great deal of controversy.
Presently, the "elected" judiciary in our large urban areas are not
truly elected by the voters, but are de facto appointees. 4 Even in
areas where true elective contests do occur, the efficacy of such a
selection system is constantly being questioned. 5 The major undertion, the New York City Bar Association, and the New York County Bar
Association have all supported reformation measures. See Selection of
Judges, 171 N.Y.L.J., 30, col. 1 (Mar. 19, 1974); Goldstein, JudicialGroups
Split On Reform, 171 N.Y.L.J. 1, col. 6 (Mar. 12, 1973).
62. Under this plan an elected chief justice or executive official would
appoint judges from a list of candidates that were submitted by an impartial nonpartisan committee that had actively sought out the best people
available for such positions. The appointee would serve for a limited term
and at certain intervals would be forced to run on his record. The voters
would cast their ballots only to determine whether the judge should be
retained in his position. If the majority did not vote to retain him, then
his position would be filled as before by the selection committee and chief
judge.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

146; see ASHMAN & ALFINI 11.

63. Kaminsky 503. The following bills regarding judicial selection, discipline, and removal were proposed during the 1974 legislative session: S.
7070; A. 8312; S. 7649; A. 9129; S. 5197; S. 5665; S. 6232; A. 7332; S. 6438;
A. 10795; A. 7092; S. 6615; A. 11482; S. 7956; A. 9363; S. 1684; A. 6256; S.
5775; A. 591.
64. ASHMAN & ALFINI 131. New York City judicial candidates often run
unopposed and endorsed by all the major parties. Id. In a recent Los

Angeles County election, only 29 of the county's 300 elected trial court
judges campaigned for their positions while 183 ran unopposed. The remainder were appointed by the governor to fill interim vacancies. Beechen,
Can JudicialElections Express The People's Choice? 57 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
242, 243 (1974).
65. See Golomb, Selection of the Judiciary; For Election, 28 N.Y.
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lying issue in such disputes lies in the public's right to elect its
officials. Those who favor the elective system advance the argument, based on the Jacksonian philosophy that to have a truly
democratic nation, all public officials including judges should be
elected by the people and be accountable to them."6
Those who would replace the elective system of judicial selection
state that although the Jacksonian concept is in theory appealing,
it is not viable in practice as applied to lower echelon public positions." Because the electorate has such little contact with the judiciary and lacks the expertise to assess its qualifications, it is unfair
to require the public to pledge their support to men about whom
they know little or nothing. The whole purpose of the elective process is to present people with an opportunity to choose from a group
of well-known candidates."
However, in both small and large communities, voters all too
often cannot even identify by name the judicial candidates for
whom they cast their ballot." Assuming that it is possible to overAss'N B. BULL. 514 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Golomb].
66. Id. at 514. Although conceeding that candidates' nominations are
based to a large degree on politics, the proponents of the elective system
contend that the majority of judges chosen have proven to be competent;
despite the selection system used some bad judges will always enter the
system; politics plays a role in any system adopted; politicians have the
best knowledge as to who is qualified for such a position in that locality;
and that the election systems assure a more representative court. Id. at
514-16. But see Address by Honorable Howell T. Heflin, Chief Justice,
Alabama Supreme Court, National Conference on Judicial Selection and
Tenure, Denver, Colo. Mar. 20-22, 1974, on file in the office of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal [hereinafter cited as Heflin Address]; Niles, The
Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New York, 22
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 242, 258-59 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Niles,
Changing Politics].
67. Winters, Judicial Selection and Tenure, in SELECTED READINGS:
JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 19, 23 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973).
68. Id.
69. Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, 38 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'y 134 (1955), in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE,
78-82 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973). A 1955 survey of Buffalo, New York City,
and Cayuga County revealed that most voters could not even recall the
names of the judicial candidates for whom they voted. In Cayuga County,
a small upstate community, only 4% of the voters surveyed could recall one
COUNTY LAW
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come this apathetic attitude and educate the public with respect to
those who are running, the prohibitive cost in doing so creates additional problems. 0 Furthermore, the costly financing of such campaigns and the requisite courting of political leaders by prospective
judicial candidates to obtain the party's nomination at the politically oriented judicial conventions cast a shadow upon the dignity
of the judiciary.
Perhaps the greatest failure within the electoral process is that
the most qualified individuals are not sought out." Even if such
well-qualified individuals were approached, it is doubtful that many
would be willing to sacrifice a secure and profitable legal practice
to engage in an extensive political campaign, travel across the city,
county, district or state to meet an apathetic electorate, and expend
extremely large sums of money in order to be elected." In addition,
incumbent judges are faced with the problem of either falling
behind in their judicial duties or campaign when election time rolls
judicial candidate they supported at the polls. Id. at 80. It has been reported that only 5 per cent of voters in one state's last general election
could name two judicial candidates for whom they voted. Address by Peter
Roper, Executive Director, Bar Association of Greater Cleveland, National
Conference on Judicial Selection and Tenure, Denver, Colo., Mar. 20-22,
1974, on file in the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal.
70. In one recent campaign, some judicial candidates spent close to
$200,000 to be elected. Heflin Address. In New York's own bitterly contested 1973 electoral contest for Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, it has been revealed that the three candidates spent
approximately $640,000 in campaign funds. 57 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 237, 238
(Jan. 1974). Los Angeles County candidates seeking trial court positions
reportedly have individually spent up to $54,000 on campaigns. Such exorbitant sums are sure to raise the eyebrows of more than a few individuals,
and causes one to wonder where this money had come from and, more
importantly, why an individual would expend such an amount to obtain a
position that provides a significantly smaller salary. Beechen, Can Judicial
Elections Express The People's Choice?, 57 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 242, 245
(1974).
71. Niles, Changing Politics 244-45.
72. See Howell Address. Based on a recent New York City Bar Association study, the long held position of the Association in favor of the merit
system for the selection of judges was reaffirmed. See Selection of Judges
372.
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around in order to remain in office.73
Although the Dominick Report presented extensive findings regarding the types and seriousness of judicial misconduct exhibited
by certain judges, the Temporary Commission's recommendations
to alleviate these problems were effectively limited to the disciplining of judges.74 The Commission failed to offer any significant proposals with respect to the selection of judicial officers. It attempted
to deal with each court separately and concluded that the selection
methods should remain essentially the same. The limited appointment of judges by the appropriate executive should continue, but
such appointments should be made from a list of candidates submitted by a selection committee.75 In concluding that the election
method should be continued,"6 the Commission, although properly
concluding that judicial nominating conventions be eliminated,
failed to consider fully the problems of campaign financing, the
political pressures exerted on such elected judges, the voters' apathy
with respect to judicial posts, and the demeaning effect campaigning has on the dignity of the judiciary.
2. Appointment of Judges
Recently, a number of states have adopted or considered proposals to establish some form of legislative or gubernatorial appointive
methods of judicial selection similar to those in our country's colonial history.77 Although there are numerous variations, the three
major forms of appointment are: appointment at the sole discretion
of a governor, mayor, legislature or executive/legislative board; appointment by governmental executive, chief justice or board subject
73. The problems inherent in a nonpartisan election are: a candidate
is often selected because of his well-known name, pleasant television image
or a strategic place on the ballot; no party is left to answer for a nonpartisan candidate's actions while in office; and a large degree of voter
apathy has been reported. Howell Address. See also Winters, Judicial
Selection and Tenure, in

SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND

23-24 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973).
74. Dominick Report 57-67.

TENURE

75.
76.
77.

Id. at 53-56.
Id.
Heflin Address. Currently 11 states have either a legislative or gub-

ernatorial appointive system. Id.
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to approval by a confirmation committee; and appointment by a
governor, board or other body or person from candidates proposed
by a nomination committee.
a.

Appointment by One Individual or Body

The absolute power to appoint is a selection method tracing its
roots to England, which still retains this method. Unlike the United
States, the English use of this method has been highly praised by
legal scholars."8
Despite the political character of the British appointing authority
and the absolute discretion exercised by these individuals, English
judges and courts have been acclaimed as the finest in the world."
One of the major reasons given for this is that England has a divided
bar of barristers (trial counsel) and solicitors (office lawyers), and
judges are chosen solely from among only the most eminent of barristers.8 Since only barristers can try cases, the English trial judge
has, unlike a number of American judges, an extensive amount of
litigation experience. 8 The majority of English appellate judges
have also had additional experience as trial judges." In addition, the
British tradition with respect to public service has guided the Prime
Minister and Lord Chancellor to base their selections on professional and not solely political characteristics, thereby preserving the
78. Campbell 263; Stason, JudicialSelection Around The World, 41 J.
AM. JUD. Soc'Y 134 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Stason]. Under the English system the power of appointment is vested in the Lord Chancellor and
the English Prime Minister. The Lord Chancellor is the principal judicial
officer in England and is the presiding judge and Speaker in the House of
Lords, England's highest tribunal. All vacancies in the High Court of Justice and county courts are filled on the Lord Chancellor's recommendation.
In addition, justices of certain local London courts are, in effect, appointed
and removed by him. The Prime Minister is empowered to appoint: the
Lord Chief Justice, the second highest ranking judicial officer; Master of
the Rolls; President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of
the High Court; seven Law Lords; and five Lord Justices. Coldstream, Judicial Appointments in England, 43 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 41, 42-43 (1959).
79. Welsh, There Is Room For An Inn, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 431, 432 (1974).
80. Id. at 432.
81. Id. at 434. See also Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors:Their Functions,
Qualificationsand Selection 36 B.U.L. REV. 1, 32-35 (1956).
82. Welsh, There Is Room for An Inn, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 431, 432 (1974).
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independence of the bench. 3
The traditional objections to the absolute uncontrolled vesting of
power in one individual rest upon the attitude of American politicians. Where a governor or mayor is the appointing instrument, the
rewards and
problem of treating judicial appointments as political
84
apparent.
readily
is
debts
payment for political
The political appointor is also subject to social pressure in the
selection of his candidates for the bench.85 Another problem is that
the system fails to provide a "regularized method" to seek out in a
political way the best or most qualified independent individuals to
sit on the bench-rather, the appointees tend to reflect the attitudes
and philosophies of the individual who appointed him.88
Although a legislative appointive system is presently exercised in
four states, 7 this system is relatively unpopular since the legislative
members competent to vote intelligently for a judicial candidate are
few in number, and political considerations unually sway the vote.
Thus, a selected judge may feel obligated to bestow political favors. " In addition, strong political influences are evidenced in that
the nominee's name comes from the majority party in control.88
California Confirmation Plan
Another method of judicial selection involves the appointments
of judges by a governor, mayor or county executive, subject to the
b.

83. Stason 137.
84. Heflin Address. This is exemplified at our federal level, where
judges are appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate, and where the percentage of partisan appointments by recent presidents reads as such: "Franklin Roosevelt-97% Democrat; Truman92.2% Democrat; Eisenhower-95% Republican; Kennedy-88.9% Democrat; Johnson-94% Democrat." Id. See also Winters, One-Man Judicial
Selection, 45 AMER. JUD. Soc'Y 198, 200 (1962), reprinted in SELECTED
READINGS: JUDICLAL SELECTION AND TENURE 85 (G. Winters ed., rev. ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Winters, One-Man Selection]; But see Brown,
A Governor's View of Judicial Selection, 49 L.A. B. BULL. 405 (1974).

85. Winters, One-Man Selection 200. In some instances this may take
the form of nepotism. Id.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Heflin Address.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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approval of a confirmation committee. This is an offshoot of the
plan adopted by some of the original states which required the governor's appointments to be confirmed by his own council. The main
theoretical distinction between the two is that the former is an
independent commission while the latter was considered to be a
rubber stamp-since all the members of the early governor's councils were appointed by the governor himself.
This plan has recently become popularly known as the California
Confirmation Plan, after the first state to adopt it." Although the
majority of California judges are selected in nonpartisan elections,"
the California Constitution provides that the judges for the state's
supreme court and court of appeals are to be appointed by the
governor contingent upon the approval of a Commission on Judicial
Appointments consisting of the Chief Justice, the Attorney General,
and a senior presiding justice of the court of appeals." All judges
that are appointed and approved are required to run against their
record at subsequent elections." This method of appointment has
recently received a great deal of attention in New York, as Chief
Judge Breitel has suggested that it be adopted and applied in the
selection of all New York judges. 4 It is appropriate therefore to
evaluate the success of this method in California in order to determine the value of incorporating it into the New York State Constitution.
The California Plan has proven only minimally effective in that
state. Admittedly, the Committee has by its mere existence been
Winters, Judical Selection and Tenure, in SELECTED READ25 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973); Winters, The Merit Plan For Judicial Selection And Tenure-Its Historical
Development, 7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 61, 70 (1968), in SELECTED READINGS-JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 29 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973). The.
California Confirmation Plan was adopted in 1934. See Thompson,
Selection of Judges of the CaliforniaCourt of Appeal, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 381,
424-425 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Thompson]. This plan is now provided for in CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 16.
91. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(c); see Thompson 381.
92. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 16; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 25300-03 (West
1961), as amended §§ 23100-05 (Supp. 1974); see Thompson 425.
93. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 16(d).
94. See note 13 supra.
90.

INGS-JUDIcIAL SELECTION AND TENURE
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able to prevent the appointment of a large number of patently unqualified individuals, yet it has been characterized as merely a
"rubber stamp" for the governor's appointments. 5 Verification lies
in the fact that "[iun practice, with one exception over thirty years
ago, the Commission always approves the governor's nomination." 6
Other objections are raised with respect to the impropriety of the
Attorney General being a member of the Commission and the inefficacy of the judge running against his own record. Regarding the
Attorney General's membership on the Commission, the objection
is based on the suspicion that bias may arise in cases before judges
whom he has confirmed." It is further alleged that when a judge
awaits voter approval on his past record, it is a mere formality since
the apathetic voters do not scrutinize a judge's record."
Proponents of the confirmation plan assert that it succeeds in
freeing judges from the pressures, expenses, and time demands of
campaigning and yet preserves the people's right to remove a
judge.."
Lack of standards for Commission approval other than the constitutional requirement that an individual be a member of the
95. Thompson 425. "Almost forty years of operation under this plan of
selection . . .demonstrates that, while providing a false veneer of merit
selection, the method is one of virtually unrestricted appointment by the
governor with all deficiencies inherent in such a system." Id.
96. Thompson 382. See also Stanton, Report and Recommendations by
Members of Study Section on Judicial Selection, THE COMMONWEALTH,
July 26, 1971, at 3.
97. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR COMMrTEE, RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF SELECTION OF APPELLATE COURT JUDGES 9
(1974) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION]. "The Attor-

ney General, who possesses one-third of the power of the body, is the lawyer
for one side in well over half of the cases coming before the Court of Appeal.
He has a self-evident interest in the selection of judges likely to rule in
his favor. If, as is conceivable, an Attorney General entertains ambition to
higher office, a need for support or at least the neutrality of the nominating
governor can influence his decision on a nominee." Thompson 426.
98. Campbell 260.
99. Address by Roger J. Traynor, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Meeting of Pennsylvania Bar Association, in 40 CAL. ST. B.J.
677, 685-86 (1965).
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bar for ten years is another criticism.' °° The Commission has no
obligation to appoint the most qualified candidate.10' In addition,
there is no investigative body to assist the Commission in determining whether an attorney is qualified for a judicial post.'0
In the wake of this general feeling of dissatisfaction,'0 3 a number
of proposals have been made by the California bar associations,
citizens groups, and executive, judicial, and legislative leaders to
amend the California Constitution to abolish other forms of selection and to institute the Merit Selection, or Missouri Plan.''
c.

The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection

The last major appointive method of judicial selection is the increasingly popular Merit, or Missouri Plan. 05 The three basic elements of the merit system are: nomination of qualified candidates
by a nonpartisan commission, appointment by the executive, and
approval by the voters. 0° The heart of the plan is the nonpartisan
nominating commission, which distinguishes it from the strict ap100. Thompson 425.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 425-26. "The body has generally based its decision upon
personal acquaintance by one or more of its members with the person
presented by the governor, or upon a most cursory investigation, generally
in the form of a few telephone calls." Id.
103. "The history of the California Commission on Judicial Appointments confirms the inherent deficiencies in its constitutional charge, manner of operations, and composition. In the almost forty years of its existence, the Commission has rejected only one out of over 100 gubernatorial
nominees-and then on ideological grounds rather than upon lack of professional qualification for the job. The possibility that the governor has
always been right in his nominees is belied by the actual performance of
some of them." Id. at 427.
104. Id. at 427-28; Finger, Annual Report of the Board of Governors,
43 CAL. ST. B.J. 635, 637-38 (1968); see Reagan, Judicial Selection In
California, 42 L.A.B. BULL. 555 (1967); Stanton, Why I Am For The
California Merit Plan, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 356 (1967); Sutro, Merits of the
Merit Planfor JudicialSelection, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 249 (1967).

105. Prior to 1950, only Missouri had this form of judicial selection.
Today twenty-one states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the territory of Guam have implemented the Merit
Selection System in whole or in part. See ASHMAN & ALFINI 2.
106. Id. at 11.
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pointive and elective systems as well as from the California Confir07
mation Plan and Bar Association Review Commission.
Contrary to what its popularly known title implies, the Missouri
Plan does not apply to the selection of judges throughout Missouri.
While mandatorily imposed with respect to the selection of state
appellate court judges, it is applicable to only the trial courts in the
city of St. Louis and Jackson County, the state's two most populated centers.""
107. Id. at 12. Prior to February 23, 1975, the only Merit Plan commission which existed in New York State was the New York City Mayor's
Committee on the Judiciary which was voluntarily adopted in 1962 by
Mayor Wagner. Id. at 132. This committee has continued in existence
under the Lindsay and Beame administrations. The committee's authority
is limited to recommending nominees for judicial appointments by the
Mayor to New York City's Criminal and Family Courts for ten year terms
and the Civil Court for interim vacancies only. Id. at 131. The present
committee is composed of a total of twenty-four members: thirteen members are selected by the two New York City appellate division presiding
justices; and eleven members are selected by the mayor. The members
serve terms concurrent with the mayor's term. Id. at 35, 130-38. In New
York, the New York City Bar Association has served an important role in
the selection of judges through its veto power over the Commission. Id. at
82-83. Consequently, candidates must receive the dual approval of the
Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary and the New York City Bar Association prior to receiving the mayor's appointment. Id. at 82-84, 139-141. The
Bar Association's Judiciary Committee and subcommittees on criminal,
family or civil courts conduct investigations and interviews of prospective
candidates. Id. at 83. At the conclusion of such investigations and interviews, a joint meeting between the Judicial Committee and the pertinent
subcommittee is held to approve or disapprove the application. Id. If a
disagreement between the Mayor's Committee and Bar Association Committee arises, a joint subcommittee is established "to determine whether
either committee had information that was not available to the other." Id.
After the joint subcommittee meets, reports are presented to the Mayor's
Committee and Bar Association Judicial Committee, and some conclusion
is reached. Id. Under the Lindsay administration, from 1966 to 1973, the
New York City Bar Association was initially assigned an advisory role in
the selection process, and later, during Mayor Lindsay's second term, the
mayor agreed not to appoint any candidate without the Bar Association's
approval. Id. at 82-83.
108. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29(a). The plan applies only to the State
Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and trial courts in St. Louis, but the
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The primary purpose of the Missouri Plan is the maintenance of
a thoroughly qualified and independent judiciary by taking the
selection and tenure of judges out of politics.' °9 The plan was
founded upon the basic mistrust of strict elective and appointive
systems."10 It inserts a theoretically nonpartisan nomination committee between the governor and the initial nomination."'
The commission presents nominees from which the governor or
executive selects the judge. The commission's membership consists
of attorneys, laymen, and judges, each serving for a six year staggered term."' The commissioners are prohibited by law from holding any public or political party office while serving as commission
members."' Such a restriction is meant to assure that partisan considerations play a minimum role in the selection of nominees, that
the commission member's duties are limited to selecting candidates, and that the commission is insulated from the pressures of
the other branches of government."'
The governor must select one of the three candidates chosen by
the commission and appoint the selectee for a one year term."' Even
constitution permits other localities to adopt it. Id.
109. See Hyde, The Missouri Method of Choosing Judges, 41 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'y 74 (1957), in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 91 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973).
110. Address by John Krusl, Jr., National Conference on Judicial
Selection and Tenure, Mar. 20-22, 1974, on file in the office of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal.
111. Id. There are three types of judicial selection commissions in
Missouri: The Appellate Judicial Commission, four Judicial Circuit Commissions, and a Municipal Judicial Nominating Commission. ASHMAN &
ALFINI

33.

112. MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 29(a), (d) (the relevant Missouri constitutional provisions). The purpose of the staggering and six year terms
is to prevent control over the commission by the executive who makes
appointments from the candidates nominated. Campbell 261.
113. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29(d); see Campbell 261.
114. Campbell 261.
115. Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 29(a), (c)(1); see Campbell 261-61. In
New York City, the role played by the New York City Bar Association has
been criticized because the Bar Association is responsible to no one in the
community for its actions, the Association Committee members' decisions
are not formally structured, and the membership of the Bar Association's
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if the governor were continually to select a nominee from his party,
the individual chosen would still be one of the most highly qualified
candidates for the position."' At the conclusion of this one year
term, the judge must run against his record for a twelve year term." 7
The major strength of the plan lies in the nominating commission.
To the extent that it is a dedicated nonpartisan commission it will
be able to seek out the most exceptionally qualified individuals to
serve as judges and eliminate the mediocre who have in the past
otherwise been elected or appointed. The commission is expected:
Judicial Committee is not broadly representative of the community or bar
association itself. ASHMAN & ALFINi 84. In addition, the "analytic justification for a grant of veto power to the bar association is no stronger than that
of any other special interest group" and may result in suspicions of self
interest and impropriety. Id. at 84.
116. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29(a) (three nominees to be selected in order
to insure the governor has a reasonable choice).
117. Id. § 29(c)(1). The Ashman study concluded that in New York
the "committee serves primarily as a screening body not as a selecting
body." ASHMAN & ALFINI 146. This conclusion was based on the finding
that the Commission accepts the majority of nominations from the
Mayor's Office. It is further evidenced that while sixty-two of the three
hundred candidates approved were deemed exceptionally well-qualified,
only twenty-six of these were chosen to fill the 156 appointments made by
Mayor Lindsay. Consequently, 130 judges were appointed who were only
deemed "qualified" while thirty-six exceptionally well-qualified individuals were not appointed. Id. at 146-47. Numerous studies of the Missouri
Plan have been conducted. These studies have uniformly concluded that
the implementation of the plan has resulted in a more highly qualified
judiciary. See, e.g., Campbell; Collett, A History of the Selection and
Tenure of Supreme Court Judges In Missouri, Mo. HIST. REV. 439 (July
1965); Niles, Changing Politics; Roberts, Twenty-Five Years Under the
Missouri Plan, 3 GA. ST. B.J. 185 (1966); Watson, Missouri Lawyers Evaluate the Merit Plan for Selection and Tenure of Judges, 52 A.B.A.J. 539
(1966). "The plan is viewed very favourably and seems to have been a
significant reform. Crossing of party political boundaries has become usual
and indeed politicians appear neither to be directly involved in, nor even
to try to influence, the system. The plan is said to combine the idea of
accountability to the electorate with an intelligent method of electing qualified candidates; it is also argued that the judge is given incentive insofar
as he will have to run for (re)election on his record-but it will be his own
record that counts and not that of his political party or that of an 'opponent.'" Campbell 261.
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to play an 'activist' role in recruiting and screening candidates while operating with sufficient dignity so as not to cause capable lawyers to become
'turned off' and refuse to be candidates for judicial office. Also, the commission must operate in a manner which will insure that the selection process
will deserve and receive public respect and trust."'
The composition of such a commission membership and the activities carried on by it are crucially important. However, a recent
survey has indicated that the present composition of the nominating
commissions are not adequately representative of a fair cross section
of our society." 9
Additional objections by opponents of the plan are based on the
same theories presented earlier by proponents of the elective system.'20 Other objections relate to the propriety of including laymen
on commissions, retention of the requirement that judges run on
their records, the methods of selection implemented by the commissions, and standards used to rate candidates. 2 '
118. Address by Allan Ashman, Director of Research, American Judicature Society, National Conference on Judicial Selection and Tenure,
Mar. 20-22, 1974, (on file in the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as Ashman Address].
119. Of the 371 commissioners responding to the the Ashman survey,
97.8% were white, 89.6% were male, and only eight belonged to minority
races. Almost 50% of the commissioners were lawyers, 5% were judges, and
45% laymen. Twenty-seven per cent of the lay members were business
executives, 8% educators, 5% journalists, 4% medical professionals, and
the remainder ranged from ranchers to housewives. Politically, the Commission did possess a bi-partisan flavor with 47.9% being Democrat and
45% Republicans. ASHMAN & ALFINI 38-39.
120. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. See also Buesser &
Kopel, JudicialAppointment or JudicialElection-Election,41 Dgr. LAW.
9 (Sept. 1973); Kratz, Will the "Merit" Plan Destroy California'sBalanced
Constitutional Government?, 43 L.A.B. BVLL. 378 (1968); Mullinax,
Judiciary Revision-An Argument Against The Merit Plan For Judicial
Selection and Tenure, 5 TEXAs TECH. L. REV. 21 (1973); Roth, Why IAm
Against The CaliforniaMerit Plan, the Missouri Plan-OrAny Reasonable
Facsimile Thereof, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 346 (1967); Ruebel 270-76.
121. Suggestions for improving the Merit Selection Systems are found
in: Nelson; Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges In
Massachusetts: The Experience of the Ad Hoc Committee, 58 MASS. L.Q.
131 (1973); Ashman Address; Address by Stuart A. Summit, Executive
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Those who criticize the participation of lay membership fail to
realize that the mere presence of such individuals creates a confidence in the commission's actions and motives. In addition, the public voice in such selections cloaks the commission with an aura of
public trust. 2'
Director, Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary, National Conference on
Judicial Selection and Tenure, Denver, Colo. Mar. 20-22, 1974 (on file in
the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal). In concluding its report,
the American Judicature Society in its Ashman Study evaluated the New
York City's merit selection plan in comparison with the true merit selection system, or Missouri Plan. The first criticism stemmed from the voluntary nature of the New York City committee. Since it serves at the pleasure
of the elected official in office, it can be abolished at any time. This weakens the committee's independence and impedes the development of
procedural regularity and accountability. Despite the objection of the possible impingement on the committee's independence, the report indicates
that in recent years "[w]hile the mayor's office has been the source for
many of the candidates reviewed and can exert substantial influence, it is
evident that the committee has not simply rubber stamped the mayor's
decision." ASHMAN & ALFINI 146. Although Mayor Wagner's committee
attempted to follow some form and standards of selection, the Lindsay
committee proceeded on an admittedly ad hoc basis. Without such criteria
there is no way to determine what constitutes a qualified or unqualified
individual. Id. at 133-35. The Ashman study has made the following recommendations as necessary to the improvement of the New York
City version of the merit selection plan: "First, the 'voluntary' plan should
be formalized by statute or 'executive' order so that the mayor's committee
is established by law. Second, the 'veto' power of the bar association should
be eliminated. Third, the mayor should be required to appoint all available
candidates rated 'exceptionally well qualified' before dipping into the pool
of candidates rated as qualified. Pooling candidates makes eminently good
sense in New York City, particularly when the mayor's committee is confronted with the task of filling hundreds of judicial positions. However, it
is inconsistent with the tenets of merit selection, and ultimately weakens
the quality of the judiciary, for the very best candidates to be arbitrarily
passed over in favor of less qualified people." Id. at 150. To fully appreciate
such recommendations it is necessary to understand the success of the
Missouri Plan, the yardstick by which the New York City voluntary plan
was measured. Although there are minor variations in merit plans that
have been adopted by the different states and localities, the model for the
majority of the jurisdictions has been the thirty-four year old Missouri
Plan.
122. Clark Address.
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Despite the additional objections to and shortcomings of the
merit nonpartisan selection system, it is clearly superior to the strict
elective and appointive systems and presents us with a starting
point to obtain the "most exceptionally qualified" individuals to
serve on our benches. It is by the continued reevaluation of such
selection methods that such merit systems will be upgraded to a
point where they are a truly representative body, devoid of any
political influence, and empowered with the necessary methods and
means to select the "most exceptionally qualified" individuals to
serve on our judicial tribunals.' 3
d. Governor Carey's Voluntary Merit Selection System
On February 23, 1975, Hugh Carey, New York's newly elected
governor, established a voluntary judicial merit selection system."'
By executive order, the Governor created a number of judicial nominating clommittees and bound himself to appoint only those individuals recommended for judicial posts by such committees.' ' The
committees will nominate individuals for permanent judicial positions in the appellate division's four departments and the court of
claims, as well as for interim posts in the court of appeals, supreme,
county, family, and surrogates courts.126
The order establishes a committee for each of the four appellate
division departments and each county.'" A statewide committee
will deal with appointments to the court of claims and interim positions on the court of appeals.'12 Each committee is charged with the
duty of examining the qualifications of all attorneys proposed by
any person or organization."' At the completion of its investigations
the committee will submit to the governor a report containing the
names of all individuals deemed "well qualified" by a majority of
its membership.3 0 In addition, a summary of each nominee's quali123. SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 216 (G.
Winters rev. ed. 1973).
124. Exec. Order No. 5, Press Release from Governor Hugh L. Carey,
Albany, N.Y., Feb. 24, 1975.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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fications must be presented to the governor and released to the
public simultaneously with the announcement of the final selection. "'
Each of the four appellate division department nominating committees is to have eleven members. 3 ' The governor and chief judge
of the court of appeals are each to appoint four members, no more
than two of whom can be of the same party and no more than two
of whom can be laymen. 3 The presiding justice of the concerned
appellate division is allowed to appoint one lawyer.'34 The four leaders of the state's legislature are to appoint jointly two members of
whom no more than one can be a nonlawyer, and each must be of a
different political party. "' The governor has retained the right to
appoint the committees' chairmen.'
The state judicial nominating committee is to consist of twelve
members.'37 The membership is to be composed of the four appellate
division departmental nominating committee chairmen and two
members of each of the four appellate division departmental committees, who are of different political parties and one of which must
be a lawyer.'38 Each departmental committee is to choose which two
of its members will sit on the statewide committee. The statewide
committee members will select their own chairman.'
Each county committee is composed of the members of the appellate division departmental nominating committee in which the
county is located plus two additional members, appointed by the
county executive or the mayor of New York City. 4 " The chairman
of the appropriate appellate division departmental committee is to
serve as the chairman of the county commission.' The state judi131.
senate
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
official
141.

Id. Copies of such reports must also be presented to the state
where such appointments are required to be confirmed. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. One of the two members appointed by the mayor or executive
must be a layman. Id.
Id.
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cial nominating committee is charged with promulgating the rules
42
and regulations which will govern all the committees.
The members of these committees may not be public or judicial
officials nor officers of a political party.'43 Although the members
serve without compensation,' they are reimbursed for all necessary
expenses incurred and are provided with a paid staff to investigate
the qualifications of prospective candidates.'45
Even though the effectiveness of the Governor's plan cannot be
determined until it has actually been in operation for a period of
time, it is possible to project the probable future success of the
system by a comparison of its structure and provisions with the
highly favored Missouri Plan' and the less effective New York City
Mayor's Committee On The Judiciary." 7
Similar to the New York City Mayor's Plan,'" the Governor has
limited the selection system to a two step process, that of an initial
selection of individuals by a nomination committee and final appointment by the executive. Unlike the Missouri Plan,' voter approval is not required. As a consequence of voter apathy, the elimination of the latter requirement should not have a profound effect
on the ultimate success of the system.' 50
Since the heart of any merit selection system is the nominating
commission,' 5 ' the membership standards and the committees'
composition must be closely scrutinized. Although the Governor
will apparently succeed in instilling the essential nonpartisan flavor
within the four appellate division departmental and the county
nominating committees by assuring at least a substantially bipartisan membership,' 52 it would appear that the state judicial nominat142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See text accompanying notes 105-23 supra.
147. See notes 107, 115, 117 supra.
148. See note 107 supra.
149. See note 117 and accompanying text.
150. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
152. This requirement that a committee have a bipartisan composition
guarantees that the committee will not be dominated by one political party
and thereby avoids the danger of strictly partisan selections. Ruebel 271.
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ing committee will not enjoy such independence. The Governor, by
retaining the right to appoint the four appellate division departmental committee chairmen, who in turn will form one-third of the
statewide committee's membership, has theoretically retained the
power to substantially influence the state committee's final nominations and to prevent an independent and nonpartisan committee
from existing.
Like the Missouri Plan,'53 the inclusion of a substantial number
of laymen on the governor's committees will help to create a public
trust in the commission's work, assuring that the public has maintained a voice in the selection of its judicial officials. In addition,
the prohibition against members being public or judicial officials or
political party officers should further ensure, as does the Missouri
Plan,' that partisan politics play only a minimal role in nomination and give added public respect to the committee by insulating
its members from the pressures of other governmental branches and
political parties. Since the members serve without compensation
and may not be appointed to a judicial office until at least one year
after termination of their committee membership, it is apparent
that such a position will not be given as a political or social re"'
ward. 55
Unlike the New York City Mayor's Committee, "' the governor's
committees are not subject to any veto power held by a state or city
bar association committee, thereby avoiding the criticisms associated with such a dual system. 5 ' However, the major criticism of
the voluntary nature of the Mayor's Plan still exists with respect to
the governor's committees. " Since the governor's committees can
be abolished at any time, by another executive order, the uncertainty of its continued existence may weaken the committee's inde153. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
154. Id.

155. Under the Missouri Plan the members likewise receive no salary
and are Compensated only to the extent of traveling and other expenses
incurred in furtherance of their duties. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29(d).
156. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
157. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
158. Id. Although the governor's plan is more stable than the mayor's
because it was established by an executive order, it can only be assured of
continued existence by the adoption of a constitutional amendment providing for such a system.
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pendence and restrict the development of procedural regularity and
accountability.'5
By limiting his selection to those individuals characterized as
"well qualified" by the various committees, the Governor has given
added assurance-not found under the Mayor's Plan' 6 -that only
qualified individuals will be selected. Although the standards used
to determine who is "well qualified""' remain to be established, the
publication of all the nominees' qualifications indirectly subjects
these standards to public scrutiny and gives the additional assurance that qualified individuals-and not political hacks-will be
selected.
To the extent that the governor's committees do not in practice
serve as a mere screening body for his appointments,' 2 accepting
and nominating only those proposed nominees submitted by the
governor or political parties, they will constitute a step forward in
restoring the public's confidence in our judiciary. Yet the Governor's
merit selection system is limited to those few appointments that can
be constitutionally made by the governor and is voluntary in nature;
it therefore fails to fully insure that qualified individuals will continually be sitting on all state court benches. Since the governor appoints' 3 only twelve percent' 4 of New York judges, the remaining
posts being filled by the electoral process, the practical impact of
the plan is minimal.
IV.

Conclusion

Although Chief Judge Breitel's proposals for court reform and
Governor Carey's recent executive order creating a voluntary merit
159. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
160. See note 117 supra. This is the same criticism that has been leveled against the California Confirmation Plan. See notes 100-01 supra and
accompanying text.
161. An in-depth discussion on the problems incurred when establishing such standards is presented in Rosenberg, The Qualities of
Justices-Are They Strainable?,44 TEXAS L. REv. 1063 (1966), in SELECTED
READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 1 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973).
162. This was one of the major criticisms of the mayor's committee. See
note 117 supra.
163. The governor's power to appoint judges is found in N.Y. CONST.
art. 6, §§ 2(c), 4(c)-(e), 9, 21(a)-(b).
164. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1975, § 4, at 8, col. 1 (editorial).
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selection system are significant advancements toward the revitalization of the New York court system and the reestablishment of
public confidence in our judicial system, only the continuous pressures exerted by our citizens' groups, bar associations, andthe judiciary itself will stir a long sleeping New York legislature into adopting the needed constitutional amendments to assure that all of New
York's judicial positions will continually be filled by the most qualified individuals. Due to the success of the Merit Selection Plan,
adoption of a constitutional amendment incorporating such a system would be of greater benefit than the California Plan or any
other system.
Recent American history has shown the vital importance of a
strong and independent judicial system. It is the judiciary which is
the key factor in the administration of justice, and it is with the
judge that any reforms must begin.
James Edward Lozier

